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Ryan v. Dist. Ct., 123 Nev. Adv. Op. No. 42 (Oct. 11, 2007) 1
CRIMINAL LAW – ATTORNEY CONFLICTS OF INTEREST
Summary
Petition for a writ of mandamus challenging a district court’s order denying petitioner’s
motion to substitute counsel.
Disposition/Outcome
The Nevada Supreme Court granted petitioner’s writ of mandamus and directed the
district court to determine whether both defendants waived their right to conflict-free
representation “knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily.” 2 In doing so, the court found that, so
long as it does not interfere with the administration of justice, a criminal defendant has the right
to knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waive conflict-free representation.
Factual and Procedural History
In March 2006, Kelly Ryan and her husband Craig Titus were charged with murder with
the use of a deadly weapon, kidnapping, accessory to murder, and third-degree arson in relation
to the murder of their roommate, Melissa Ann James. The State alleged that Ryan and Titus
might have implicated each other in the murder.
In September 2006, Titus retained Marc Saggese, Esq., of Cristalli & Saggese. In
February 2007, Ryan sought to substitute Michael Cristalli of Cristalli & Saggese as her new
counsel, replacing attorney Gregory Denue. In light of the potential conflict of interest of such
dual representation, Cristalli explained to Ryan the “particulars” of Cristalli & Saggese
representing both defendants. He also drafted a conflict-waiver letter and had it signed by both
Ryan and Titus. This letter stated the following:
(1) neither defendant has implicated the other in the crimes charged; (2) after a
thorough review of discovery and lengthy discussions with multiple counsel,
neither defendant intends to plead guilty or cooperate with the State; (3) a joint
defense agreement has been prepared to be executed by both defendants and both
attorneys; (4) either defendant’s decision to cooperate with the State might change
the firm’s ability to continue representation; (5) in the event of a serious conflict
or disagreement, the firm would be required to withdraw and represent neither
defendant; and (6) the firm’s withdrawal would be ‘inconvenient and potentially
adverse to each [defendant],’ but the defendants understood that the ‘present
benefits of dual representation outweigh this contingent problem.’ 3
The district court appointed outside counsel to speak with Ryan about the potential
conflicts of interest inherent in the dual representation. Though this attorney spent a
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“significant” amount of time with Ryan, he “had no meaningful dialogue” with her regarding the
representation “because it appeared that her mind was already made up.” 4
The district court then questioned both Ryan and Titus regarding the ramifications of the
dual representation. Both defendants acknowledged that they had received copies of the conflictwaiver letter, that they understood the contents of the letter, and that they did indeed wish to
waive any potential conflict.
The district court denied Ryan’s request for substitution of counsel. Its rationale was
that, even if no clear conflict arose during the trial, the potential issue of ineffective assistance of
counsel would likely come up on appeal. The court also found that the joint defense agreement
posed “a very serious potential for conflict,” 5 even if there was no actual conflict.
Upon the court’s denial of her request for substitution, Ryan petitioned the Supreme
Court for a writ of mandamus.
Discussion
The Nevada Supreme Court looked to an Eighth Circuit case for the proposition that
lawyers are not interchangeable. The Eighth Circuit explained,
[w]ithin the range of effective advocacy, attorneys will differ as to their trial
strategy, oratory style, and the importance they place on certain legal issues. They
may also differ with respect to expertise in certain areas of law, and experience or
familiarity with opposing counsel and the judge. These differences will impact a
trial in every way the presence or absence of counsel impacts a trial.6
The court concluded that, though a trial court has broad discretion in balancing the need
for the overall administration of justice against a criminal defendant’s Constitutional choice of
his own counsel, “there is a strong presumption in favor of a non-indigent criminal defendant’s
right to counsel of her own choosing.” 7 Once a criminal defendant has been cautioned regarding
the potential dangers of conflicted dual representation, he cannot be constrained to choose his
right to conflict-free representation over the right to his chosen defense strategy. 8 However, if a
criminal defendant does exercise his right, knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily to choose a
dual representation carrying a risk of potential conflict, he has forever waived the resulting
conflict of interest.
Furthermore, the court concluded that when such a criminal defendant knowingly,
intelligently, and voluntarily waives the right to conflict-free representation, he also waives any
right he might have to later seek a mistrial arising out of the conflicted representation. He also
waives his right to any appeal based on the ineffective assistance of counsel.
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With this decision, the court overruled its prior holding in Hayes v. State, 9 to the extent
that the decision allowed a trial court to declare a mistrial due to a conflict of interest, even after
such conflict had been knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waived.
In applying its rule, the court noted that the trial court “was not convinced that Ryan’s
and Titus’s waivers of conflict-free counsel were knowing, intelligent, and voluntary.” 10
Therefore, in granting Ryan’s petition in part, the court directed the district court to determine
whether the parties did make a knowing, intelligent, and voluntary waiver, and to advise the
parties that their waiver of the right to conflict-free representation prevents them from seeking a
mistrial or raising claims of ineffective assistance of counsel resulting from any conflict arising
from the waiver.
Dissent
MAUPIN, C.J., dissenting:
Chief Justice Maupin dissented from the majority’s conclusion that Ryan’s waiver of
conflict-free representation could potentially be approved. Instead, he thinks that Saggese and
Cristalli failed to assure that Ryan’s decision to waive the conflict was done knowingly,
intelligently, and voluntarily. He was particularly concerned with the lack of access to, or advice
from, outside counsel in making the determination.
Conclusion
When a non-indigent criminal defendant’s choice of legal representation results in dual or
multiple representation of clients whose interests are potentially in conflict, the defendant may
waive his right to conflict-free counsel. His attorney, in seeking the dual or multiple
representation, must advise all defendants of their right to seek outside counsel for advice on the
ramifications of the potential conflict of interest. Should the defendants opt not to seek that
advice, they must waive their right to do so expressly. If they do not, their waiver of conflictfree representation will be ineffective. The district court must accept a defendant’s waiver to
conflict-free representation so long as it is obtained knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily.
Upon the district court’s acceptance of the defendant’s waiver, he is forever prevented from
seeking a mistrial arising out of the waived conflict, or from claiming that the waived conflict
resulted in ineffective assistance of counsel.
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